Pressure was also exerted on the manager of one of the leading trading companies involved in the handling of the Rhodesian sugar; he was told by British officials that he, or his company, might be prosecuted under the legislation providing for sanctions against Rhodesia. He rejected the warning. British pressure was abandoned only after the personal intervention of the prime minister: Dr. (now President) Banda is understood to have couched his objections in the strongest language.

Malawi's sugar imports make up only a small part of Rhodesia's total exports. Nevertheless, their loss at this juncture would have been a very serious blow to the turnover of Rhodesia's Chirundu estates.

Malawi officials cite the fact that no such pressure has been brought to bear against Zambia, whose sugar refinery obtains its raw supplies from the very same Rhodesian sources. They feel they are the victims of discriminatory treatment on the part of Whitehall. Britain's unwillingness to offer financial help to enable them to buy sugar from non-Rhodesian sources contrasts oddly, in their view, with the lavish assistance offered by Mr. Wilson's government to Zambia—whose foreign exchange position is much healthier than Malawi's.

All along, Dr. Banda has taken care to keep his relations with the illegal Rhodesian regime on an even keel. Mr. Ian Smith made an unpublicised two-day visit to Malawi in March. It is understood that, in exchange for a pledge of "neutrality" from Dr. Banda's government, he gave an undertaking that no restrictions would be placed on the flow of Rhodesian funds into Malawi. These are of the greatest importance to Malawi, in the context of its balance-of-payments problems. Prominent among these items are the transfers of the earnings of Malawian workers in Rhodesia, which now come to more than £1 million a year.

Another part of the bargain was that Mr. Smith would take no action to expel Malawian workers—estimated at between 75,000 and 100,000—if he eventually decided to get rid of the 50,000-odd Zambians who work in his country. He is now reported to be contemplating this move.

Meanwhile, the sugar dispute has served to increase President Banda's disquiet about the possible political implications of his country's reliance on the annual subsidy from Britain, which this year totals just over £5 million.

Johnson-Fulbright Feud Deepens

The furore over recent American actions in North Vietnam has put the spotlight once more on the relationship between President Johnson and his most vehement congressional critic, Senator Fulbright. Some weeks ago, the President tried to cozen the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into approval of the Administration's foreign aid programme, but in vain; now, once again, the gloves are off between them.

For a period it was fashionable in White House circles to decry Fulbright as a maverick without real political power, whose criticisms could be summarily dismissed. In the light of recent events, this attitude no longer holds water. Contrary to Administration hopes and forecasts, recent political in-fighting in Washington seems to have strengthened Fulbright's position.

The differences between the two men are of more than personal significance—they illustrate vividly the fundamental dilemmas underlying American strategy and policies. In simplified terms the points of issue are:

1. Fulbright's whole conception of a "flexible" foreign policy, which conflicts with the President's more "rigid" approach.
2. Vietnam and China: inevitably, these are the main bone of contention at the moment.
3. The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in relation to the Foreign Relations Committee.
4. The rivalry between the Jackson sub-committee on national security and Senator Fulbright's committee.

(i) **Fulbright's philosophy:** In general terms, Senator Fulbright's thesis is that American policy is too rigid, and that as a result the United States is estranging nearly all its allies: (*a*) west Germany—by "leaning on it" to buy arms it does not want; (*b*) France—by trying to isolate General de Gaulle; (*c*) Canada—by snubbing Mr. Pearson over Vietnam and Mr. Paul Martin over the way to handle de Gaulle; and (*d*) Britain—by hinting that Mr. Wilson's government is reneging on its pledges to Seato.

But this thesis now extends to scientific matters. For example, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, in testimony before the Fulbright committee, recently suggested that the United States could abandon its insistence on on-site inspections as a pre-requisite of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. This, however, was immediately opposed by the State Department. Dr. Wiesner's view, also held by Fulbright, that an east-west détente should precede a European settlement, is contemptuously regarded by the department as a misguided "gaullist" concept.

(ii) **The Vietnam Issue:** The senator professes to be mystified why people happily accept "national communism" in Europe, as divisive of the communist world, but reject this concept in the context of Vietnam and south-east Asia. His belief on Vietnam is that "the existence of a strong communist state which poses a barrier to expansion by aggressive communist power may be more desirable from the standpoint of American interests than a weak non-communist state."

DISPUTE OVER BRIEFINGS

The quarrel naturally extends to the best way of dealing with Peking. Fulbright's view is that escalation of the war in Vietnam hardens not merely the resistance of the North Vietnamese but the Chinese "Stalinists"; he believes that a different American policy could hasten the day when "moderates" will prevail in Peking. The President's interpretation is (or appears to be) that current disunity in Peking makes intervention in Vietnam extremely unlikely.

(iii) **The CIA squabble:** Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee share Fulbright's strong views about the use of foreign aid. They believe it has ceased to be a constructive contribution to international welfare and become a mere instrument of "counter-insurgency." More important, they resent the fact that they are not informed about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency—apparently on

President Johnson's instructions. Moves to secure the same kind of briefing as the CIA accords to a select group of senators from the armed services committee, and the appropriations committees, were turned down with disagreeable hints—which seemed to emanate from the White House—that to make such a group of dissidents privy to CIA confidences would only lead to information leakages.

(iv) ***The Jackson Sub-committee:*** The latest Administration attempt to turn the flank of the senator's committee took a devious form. It involved giving a greater role to the Jackson committee.

Senator Henry M. Jackson's sub-committee on national security and international operations has for years been inquiring into the efficiency of American embassies abroad and their relations with the State Department's machinery at home. Suddenly, the Jackson sub-committee switched its attention to broader and larger issues.

It took testimony from Mr. Dean Acheson, General Norstad, Mr. J. J. McCloy, and Professor Thomas C. Schelling about Nato; and, "in co-operation with the executive branch," it produced a study of the role of the Warsaw Pact in east European affairs. Senator Jackson is a close and loyal associate of the President.

These developments prompted Senator Fulbright to complain that the Foreign Relations Committee was itself about to produce such a study, and he has raised the issue of the competence of the other committee to report on these larger political matters. His question is likely to remain unanswered.

It would be unfair to suggest that all the witnesses before the Jackson sub-committee are blind supporters of the President. After all, one of the members of the sub-committee is Senator Robert Kennedy. But, in general, the witnesses have supported a policy of military firmness, and taken for granted the pre-eminence of the United States in world affairs.

ATTITUDE OF DISDAIN

Witnesses before the Fulbright committee, on the other hand, have stressed the need for détente with the Russians, have suggested that General de Gaulle may be on the right lines, and argued that to go on shouldering arms on a massive scale may not be the best way for the United States to achieve the Great Society. (For example, Professor Henry Kissinger suggested to the Fulbright committee that President Johnson should consider having talks with de Gaulle, while Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that Germany could help matters by unreservedly accepting the Oder-Neisses boundary as part of a general European settlement. Professor Kissinger added that American society could not bear the strain of dealing with all the world's major problems—which is one of Fulbright's favourite themes. The suggested Johnson-de Gaulle meeting was an echo of a statement previously made by Senator Frank Church, who was to some extent echoing Fulbright.)

Ironically, President Kennedy almost selected Fulbright as his Secretary of State, instead of Mr. Rusk (and, according to Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, later wished he had). Today, five and a half years later, Fulbright probably causes more vexation in the White House than any other western political figure apart from de Gaulle. Some critics of the Administration display disillusion, some anger; but Fulbright's attitude is one of disdain—and that, apparently, is what President Johnson finds especially hard to take.